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WHEN LIFE IS AN INJURY: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO WRONGFUL LIFE LAWSUITS
THOMAS A. BURNS
INTRODUCTION
Can life be an injury? Jurists, theologians, and philosophers have
spilled much ink over this question.1 Wrongful birth and wrongful life
lawsuits are frequently debated in courts and academic circles. In
broad overview, wrongful birth lawsuits are prenatal negligence suits
brought by the parents of a deformed or retarded child against a doc-
tor who negligently failed to diagnose or inform the parents about po-
tential birth defects. Wrongful life lawsuits, on the other hand, are
prenatal negligence suits brought on behalf of the deformed or re-
tarded child against a doctor who negligently failed to diagnose or in-
form the child’s parents about potential birth defects. Generally,
courts dismiss wrongful life lawsuits because they fail to perceive that
Copyright © 2003 by Thomas A. Burns.
1. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978) (“Whether it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery
more properly to be left to the philosophers and theologians.”); AUGUSTINE, THE ESSENTIAL
AUGUSTINE 70 (Vernon J. Bourke ed., 1974) (arguing that understanding is more excellent than
merely living or existing, because “even a stone exists, and a beast lives, yet I do not think that a
stone lives, or that a beast understands[, b]ut he who understands assuredly both exists and
lives”); DAVID HUME, On Suicide, in FOUR DISSERTATIONS; AND, ESSAYS ON SUICIDE AND
THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL 1, 21 (photo. reprint 2000) (1783) (“I believe that no man ever
threw away life, while it was worth keeping.”); FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE §
341, at 273–74. (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) (1882):
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into your loneliest loneli-
ness and say to you: “This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live
once more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every
pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or
great in your life will have to return to you, all in the same succession and se-
quence . . . .”
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would
have answered him: “You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine.”
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the child has suffered any legally cognizable injury: had the doctor not
been negligent, the child would not exist.
This Note contends that wrongful life lawsuits should be cogni-
zable because, when viewed through an entitlement model, they have
the same economic consequences as wrongful birth lawsuits. To
achieve this end, injury in wrongful life lawsuits should be conceived
of as a financial injury to the individual child. When injury is thus
conceptualized in a narrow, economic sense, the nonexistence para-
dox—comparing injured existence to nonexistence—dissolves. This
reconceptualization would justify awarding special damages for medi-
cal costs and any punitive damages to the child, but would forbid re-
covery of general damages for pain, suffering, and emotional distress.
Currently, three courts have reached this result intuitively.2
However, these three courts explicitly ignored the nonexistence para-
dox, essentially admitting that they preferred an approach of fairness.3
This Note resuscitates their conclusion via economic analysis by ex-
plaining that, in fact, not only is their conclusion both just and fair, it
also comports with leading economic theory. Thus, to answer the
opening question, life can be a compensable injury.
To this end, Part I elucidates wrongful life and wrongful birth,
and introduces the nonexistence paradox. Part II examines the water-
shed cases of wrongful life and wrongful birth jurisprudence. Part III
reviews the wrongful life literature and explains why attempts to cir-
cumvent the nonexistence paradox have failed. Part IV introduces the
entitlement framework. Part V applies the entitlement framework to
wrongful life claims and redefines injury.
I.  PRENATAL NEGLIGENCE BACKGROUND
Wrongful life and wrongful birth are the latest developments in
prenatal negligence jurisprudence. Initially, in the late 1960s, Ameri-
can law recognized neither parents’ wrongful birth claims nor chil-
dren’s wrongful life claims.4 Within ten years, however, the law began
2. See infra Part II.F.
3. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 772 (N.J. 1984) (Schreiber, J., dissenting) (“Once
one acknowledges, as the majority has, that the child has no cause of action for general damages
stemming from wrongful life, it is unfair and unjust to charge the doctors with the infant’s medi-
cal expenses.” (citation omitted)); infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text; infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
4. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692, 693 (N.J. 1967) (holding that a child could not
state a claim for wrongful life, and that his parents could not state a claim for wrongful birth).
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to recognize parents’ wrongful birth claims.5 Until 1982, no state su-
preme court permitted wrongful life lawsuits at all.6 Currently, no
American jurisdiction permits a child to recover general damages for
wrongful life lawsuits.7
A. Defining Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth
Wrongful life is a unique and controversial kind of prenatal neg-
ligence lawsuit that is usually contrasted with wrongful birth. Wrong-
ful birth claims are brought by the parents (generally the mother)
against the doctor who gave prenatal treatment and negligently failed
to diagnose or inform that the child would probably be retarded or
deformed, thereby denying her the opportunity to abort.8 Wrongful
life claims, on the other hand, generally arise when a child is born de-
formed or retarded and sues his doctor for negligently diagnosing or
informing his mother about his condition, thereby denying his mother
the opportunity to abort. As a practical matter, wrongful life claims
are only brought when the parents are unavailable to sue for wrongful
birth, as when the parents suddenly die or fail to sue during the stat-
ute of limitations.9
It is imperative to note that in neither wrongful life nor wrongful
birth lawsuits did the doctor, strictly speaking, cause the child to be-
come deformed or retarded. If, for example, a doctor had negligently
or intentionally prescribed thalidomide to a mother, and this de-
formed or retarded her child, the doctor would be liable to the
mother and the child for ordinary prenatal negligence. The real nov-
elty of wrongful life and wrongful birth claims is that the child, tragi-
5. See Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 813 (recognizing parents’ wrongful birth claim for the first
time, but limiting their recovery to medical expenses, and forbidding them from recovering for
psychic or emotional harm).
6. For the first case to recognize a limited wrongful life claim, see Turpin v. Sortini, 643
P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982).
7. Since 2000, the Cour de cassation (France’s rough equivalent of the U.S. Supreme
Court) has made headlines around the world with its rapidly developing wrongful life jurispru-
dence, L’Arrêt Perruche, in which the Cour de cassation has recognized a child’s right to sue his
doctors to recover general and special damages for negligently failing to diagnose or inform his
parents about his potential deformation. Cass. ass. plén., Nov. 17, 2000, JCP 2000 II 10,438,
available at http://www.courdecassation.fr/agenda/arrets/arrets/99-13701arr.htm.
8. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370
(5th ed. 1984).
9. E.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984) (“Here, the parents’ claim is
barred by the statute of limitations. Does this mean that Peter must forego medical treatment
for his blindness, deafness, and retardation? We think not.”).
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cally, was already condemned to a deformed or retarded existence be-
fore the doctor negligently failed to diagnose or apprise the mother of
the child’s condition. So, to continue the thalidomide example, in a
wrongful life or wrongful birth claim, the doctor would merely have
been negligent in failing to tell the mother that her previous ingestion
of thalidomide might deform or retard her fetus.
To summarize, wrongful life claims are brought by or on behalf
of children; wrongful birth claims are brought by or on behalf of par-
ents. Nevertheless, courts treat wrongful life and wrongful birth
claims as having very different conceptual grounds. Since Roe v.
Wade,10 courts have had no difficulty identifying which of the
mother’s rights was injured: her constitutional right to choose
whether to carry her fetus to term.11 Thus, when doctors negligently
fail to diagnose or inform the mother of the child’s potential retarda-
tion or deformation, they have injured the mother’s right to choose.
As a result, it is no longer controversial to award damages to parents
for wrongful birth.12 Wrongful life, on the other hand, creates enor-
mous conceptual difficulties,13 because the nonexistence paradox pre-
vents courts from identifying any right of the child that has been in-
jured.14 As one court expressed the nonexistence paradox, “[t]he
infant plaintiff is therefore required to say not that he should have
been born without defects but that he should not have been born at
all.”15
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. See id. at 163–64 (holding that a woman had a constitutionally protected right to termi-
nate her pregnancy).
12. See infra notes 60–61, 69 and accompanying text.
13. F. Allan Hanson, Suits for Wrongful Life, Counterfactuals, and the Nonexistence Prob-
lem, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 4 (1996):
[S]uits for wrongful life pose a dilemma. On the one hand are issues of common
sense, compassion, and fairness. The negligent behavior of the defendant has caused
preventable medical expenses, pain, and suffering. It seems entirely just to fix the re-
sponsibility for the injury and to allow a remedy for the tragedy. On the other hand, it
is conceptually problematic in wrongful life cases to conclude that the defendant
caused the plaintiff injury and to exact compensation when, but for the defendant’s
conduct, the plaintiff would not exist.
14. See, e.g., infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (describing one court’s attempt to
ascribe a fundamental right to children to be born as a whole, functional human being); infra
Part III.A (describing Judge Handler’s adequate parenting theory).
15. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967) (emphasis added).
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B. The Nonexistence Paradox
In all negligence actions, plaintiffs must plead and prove four
elements: duty, breach, causation, and injury.16 In wrongful life and
wrongful birth lawsuits, courts have no difficulty finding or accepting
that (1) the doctor had duties running toward both the mother and
the fetus, (2) the doctor breached those duties, and (3) if the doctor
had not breached those duties, the mother would have aborted the fe-
tus.17 However, the injury element is the real stumbling block for
courts, and gives rise to the nonexistence paradox.
The nonexistence paradox, simply stated, is that that the child is
claiming that it is an injury for him to be alive—that his very life is
wrongful. Courts have addressed this concern in various ways. At
first, because the general rule in tort when calculating damages is to
make the plaintiff whole (i.e., return him to his former condition),
courts dismissed wrongful life lawsuits because damages were impos-
sible to calculate.18 This is because calculating damages required com-
paring the child’s injured existence with nonexistence, and determin-
ing which was better and by how much. However, the impossibility-
of-calculation rationale fell into disfavor, so subsequent courts justi-
fied their dismissal of wrongful life lawsuits because there was no “le-
gally cognizable injury,” in addition to the immeasurable damages.19
Finally, the impossibility-of-calculation rationale was entirely aban-
doned, and courts rejected wrongful life lawsuits simply because they
refused to recognize that the child had suffered a legal injury.20
Using these policy reasons, courts have refused to find an injury
because they wished to protect the sanctity of life,21 and because, as
mortal judges, they felt that they lacked the competence to compare
16. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 30, at 164–65.
17. See, e.g., Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful
Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 205–23 (1993) (explaining how the traditional tort
framework applies to wrongful life lawsuits).
18. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692.
19. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).
20. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979) (rejecting the impossibility-of-calculation
rationale, but still denying a wrongful life claim because of the “different premise—that Sharon
has not suffered any damage cognizable at law by being brought into existence”).
21. See, e.g., id. (“One of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life—whether
experienced with or without a major physical handicap—is more precious than nonlife.”).
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deformed existence to nonexistence.22 Even the few courts that have
permitted children to recover special damages in wrongful life law-
suits have denied general damages because of the nonexistence para-
dox.23
II.  THE GROWTH OF WRONGFUL LIFE AND
WRONGFUL BIRTH JURISPRUDENCE
Wrongful life and wrongful birth have had turbulent formative
years. Initially, neither claim was recognized. Then, wrongful birth
was recognized, but not wrongful life. Finally, three courts recognized
limited wrongful life claims to recover special damages. This Part
traces the judicial life cycle of wrongful life and wrongful birth.
A. Conception: Zepeda v. Zepeda
An Illinois appellate court heard the first wrongful life claim in
the world in Zepeda v. Zepeda.24 A grown man sued his father for
being “born an adulterine bastard.”25 Previously, his father had “in-
duced the plaintiff’s mother to have sexual relations by promising to
marry her.”26 However, the father broke this promise because he was
already married to another woman.27
22. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812. Of course, judges and commentators criticize these ration-
ales. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 765 (N.J. 1984) (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting):
[T]he Court itself need not express a preference of life over nonlife but only under-
stand that individuals in necessitous situations have the right to make that choice. We
should acknowledge, therefore, that in determining whether the afflicted infant has a
cause of action for wrongful life, the Court is neither compelled nor asked to assume
a Hamlet role.
Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in “Wrongful Life” Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505,
527 (1991) (suggesting that courts use “the injury argument to mask [their] underlying
policy concerns”).
23. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 963–64 (Cal. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656
P.2d 483, 496 (Cal. 1983); Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763.
24. 190 N.E.2d 849, 852 (Ill. 1963) (quoting an expert who could not find any similar claim
having ever been raised anywhere). The court also coined the phrase “wrongful life.” Id. at 858.
25. Id. at 851. The plaintiff sued for damages “for the deprivation of his right to be a le-
gitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to in-
herit from his paternal ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard.” Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Although the Zepeda court recognized that the father had duties
running to his son (even before the son came into being),28 the court
dismissed the claim because it feared that many illegitimate children
might bring suit, which would overwhelm the court system.29 More
importantly, the court worried that many circumstances into which
children were born would be considered injuries.30 For these reasons,
the court felt that the legislature was a more appropriate forum than
the judiciary to recognize claims for wrongful life.31
The Zepeda court’s analysis is fascinating in light of subsequent
wrongful life jurisprudence: it never squarely addressed the nonexist-
ence paradox.32 Moreover, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
suffered an injury.33 Thus, the court found that all the elements of a
tort had been satisfied, but still dismissed the claim.34 In retrospect,
this outcome is remarkable. Subsequent courts denied wrongful life
claims because no tort occurred—not because a tort had occurred,
but other policy reasons forbade them from recognizing it.
B. Gestation: Gleitman v. Cosgrove
Gleitman v. Cosgrove35 was the first traditional wrongful life and
wrongful birth lawsuit. Jeffrey Gleitman’s mother consulted doctors
when she was two months pregnant.36 Although she informed them
that she had been diagnosed with German measles (i.e., Rubella) one
28. Id. at 853–55 (analyzing three hypothetical prenatal torts in which the duty was
breached before the child was conceived, and concluding that duties run to fetuses before con-
ception).
29. Id. at 858 (suggesting that there were as many as 250 thousand illegitimate children—
potential plaintiffs—in the United States in 1960 alone).
30. Id. (“One might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another because of
race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family
characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute family, another because a parent
has an unsavory reputation.”).
31. Id. at 859:
If we are to have a legal action for such a radical concept as wrongful life, it should
come after thorough study of the consequences. . . . The interest of society is so in-
volved, the action needed to redress the tort could be so far-reaching, that the policy
of the State should be declared by the representatives of the people.
32. See id. at 857 (omitting any discussion of the nonexistence paradox or sanctity of life
concerns). The court’s omission is surprising because, although the Zepeda court may have
planted the seeds for later courts’ holdings, things could have turned out very differently.
33. Id. (“Children born illegitimate have suffered an injury. If legitimation does not take
place, the injury is continuous. If legitimation cannot take place, the injury is irreparable.”).
34. Id. at 857–58.
35. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
36. Id. at 690.
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month earlier,37 the doctors negligently informed her that “the Ger-
man measles would have no effect at all on her child.”38 Jeffrey was
born blind and deaf.39 Had Jeffrey’s mother known the probabilities,
she would have aborted.40
The court denied Jeffrey’s wrongful life claim because it was im-
possible to measure Jeffrey’s damages.41 It is imperative to recognize
that, although the court noted the nonexistence paradox,42 it dis-
missed the claim not because Jeffrey did not suffer any injury, but
simply because it felt that courts and juries lacked the competence to
calculate Jeffrey’s damages accurately.43 The court held that Jeffrey
had no “damages cognizable at law,”44 as opposed to later courts that
would hold that the plaintiff suffered no injury cognizable at law.
The court likewise denied the parents’ wrongful birth claim, even
though they “[stood] in a somewhat different position,”45 because it
was impossible to measure their damages.46 The court also justified its
wrongful birth holding on the grounds of administrability and the
“countervailing public policy supporting the preciousness of human
life.”47
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 691.
41. Id. at 692 (“The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference between his life
with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determi-
nation.”).
42. Id. at 692 (“The infant plaintiff is therefore required to say not that he should have
been born without defects but that he should not have been born at all.”); see also id. at 711
(Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part) (“Ultimately, the infant’s complaint is that it would be bet-
ter off not to have been born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly
know whether that is so.”).
43. Id. (“[I]t is impossible to make such a determination.”).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. The position was different because “Mrs. Gleitman can say that an abortion would
have freed her of the emotional problems caused by the raising of a child with birth defects; and
Mr. Gleitman can assert that it would have been less expensive for him to abort rather than
raise the child.” Id. at 692–93.
46. Id. at 692 (“[A] court would have to evaluate the denial to [the parents] of the intangi-
ble, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh
these against the alleged emotional and money injuries.”).
47. Id. at 693 (“The right to life is inalienable in our society. . . . A child need not be perfect
to have a worthwhile life.”).
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C. The Birth of Wrongful Birth: Becker v. Schwartz
In Park v. Chessin,48 a lower New York court startlingly found
that a child had the “fundamental right . . . to be born as a whole,
functional human being.”49 In Becker v. Schwartz,50 the consolidated
appeal,51 doctors negligently failed to inform one mother that, be-
cause she was thirty-seven years old when she conceived, her children
were more likely to have Down’s syndrome.52 Other doctors negli-
gently informed another mother that her chances of giving birth to a
second child afflicted with fatal polycystic kidney disease were “prac-
tically nil.”53 Both mothers then gave birth to children with birth de-
fects.54 Had they been properly informed, the first mother would have
aborted, and the second mother would have never conceived.55
The Becker court dismissed the resulting wrongful life claims be-
cause (1) the plaintiffs suffered no legal injury, and (2) the plaintiffs’
damages were impossible to measure. The court expressly disavowed
the Park court’s bold holding.56 In what has since become perhaps the
most quoted passage in wrongful life jurisprudence, the Becker court
cited sanctity of life concerns intertwined with its complaint that
courts lack competence to administrate the complaints as the reasons
for its decision:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have been
born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be
left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can as-
sert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the
very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind has
placed on human life, rather than its absence.57
48. 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977).
49. Id. at 114.
50. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E. 2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
51. Park was consolidated on appeal with Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977), and the Court of Appeals of New York reconsidered Park’s holding the following
year. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 809.
52. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 808.
53. Id. at 809.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 810.
56. Id. at 812 (“There is no precedent for recognition at the Appellate Division of ‘the fun-
damental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being.’” (quoting Park, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 114)).
57. Id.
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Damages were impossible to measure because the wrongful life
claims at issue required courts to make “a comparison between the
Hobson’s choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence.”58 The
court felt that “the law [wa]s not equipped to make”59 this compari-
son.
However, the Becker court was cognizant of Roe v. Wade,60 so it
permitted the parents’ wrongful birth claims.61 Nevertheless, although
the parents could recover special damages, the court forbade the par-
ents from recovering “for psychic or emotional harm.”62 That is be-
cause the parents, as parents, would receive offsetting benefits.63
In short, although the wrongful birth legal theory experienced a
very troubled labor, it was finally placed into the world.
D. The Tender Toddler Years: Berman v. Allan
In Berman v. Allan,64 the Supreme Court of New Jersey recon-
sidered Gleitman.65 Doctors negligently failed to inform Sharon Ber-
man’s mother about the availability of an amniocentesis test that
would have detected whether Sharon was afflicted with Down’s syn-
drome.66 Her mother would have aborted had she known Sharon was
afflicted with Down’s syndrome.67
The Berman court rejected Sharon’s wrongful life claim, but
abandoned Gleitman’s difficulty-of-measuring-damages rationale.68
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
61. Unlike the child’s complaint, the parents’ damages were ascertainable. Becker, 386
N.E.2d at 813 (defining the parents’ damages as “the pecuniary expense which they have borne,
and in Becker must continue to bear, for the care and treatment of their infants,” and differenti-
ating these damages from the child’s damages because “[c]alculation of damages necessary to
make plaintiffs whole in relation to these expenditures requires nothing extraordinary”).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 814 (“[P]arents may yet experience a love that even an abnormality cannot fully
dampen. To assess damages for emotional harm endured by the parents of such a child would, in
all fairness, require consideration of this factor in mitigation of the parents’ emotional inju-
ries.”).
64. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
65. Id. at 10.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 12 (“Difficulty in the measure of damages is not . . . our sole or even primary con-
cern.”).
BURNS IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03 2:51 PM
2003] WHEN LIFE IS AN INJURY 817
Instead, the court held that Sharon suffered no injury at law because
it wanted to preserve the sanctity of life.69
E. First Words: Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories
In 1980, a California appellate court took another bold step in
wrongful life jurisprudence in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories.70
Shauna Curlender was born with Tay-Sachs disease and had a four-
year life expectancy because Bio-Science negligently failed to detect
that her parents were potential carriers of this hereditary disease.71
Had Bio-Science detected this disease, the Curlenders would have ei-
ther avoided conceiving Shauna or aborted.72 The parents and Shauna
sued for medical expenses, emotional distress, and the deprivation of
“72.6 years of her life.”73
In permitting recovery for wrongful life, the court almost ex-
pressly admitted that it was ignoring the intellectual consequences of
the nonexistence paradox:
The reality of the “wrongful life” concept is that such a plaintiff both
exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others. It is neither neces-
sary nor just to retreat into meditation on the mysteries of life. We
need not be concerned with the fact that had defendants not been
negligent, the plaintiff might not have come into existence at all. . . .
[A] reverent appreciation of life compels recognition that plaintiff,
however impaired she may be, has come into existence as a living
person with certain rights.74
The court tailored damages to allow the child to recover general and
special damages for the pain and suffering she experienced during her
actual life span.75 Moreover, the court also permitted the child to re-
69. Id. (“One of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that life—whether experi-
enced with or without a major physical handicap—is more precious than nonlife.”). Neverthe-
less, the court was cognizant of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), so it upheld the parents’
wrongful birth claims. Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. Although admitting that measuring damages
would be troublesome, the court refused to follow Becker, and permitted the parents to recover
general damages for their wrongful life claims. Id. at 15. Nevertheless, the court, citing windfall
concerns, refused to let the parents recover special damages for medical expenses. Id. at 14.
70. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
71. Id. at 480–81.
72. Id. at 480.
73. Id. at 481.
74. Id. at 488.
75. Id. at 489.
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cover punitive damages in wrongful life lawsuits.76 However, as the
short life span of this opinion attests, the court went too far. The
Curlender court suggested that parents should also be potential de-
fendants in wrongful life lawsuits.77 This case ultimately sowed the
seeds for the highest courts of California, Washington, and New Jer-
sey to allow children to recover special damages in wrongful life law-
suits, while forbidding recovery of general damages.
F. The Adolescence of Wrongful Life: Turpin v. Sortini, Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis, Inc., and Procanik v. Cillo
1. California. The Supreme Court of California first considered
wrongful life in Turpin v. Sortini,78 in which a doctor negligently diag-
nosed a couple’s first child as having hearing within normal limits; in
fact, the child was stone deaf, and the condition was hereditary.79 Re-
lying on this diagnosis, the couple conceived and gave birth to a sec-
ond child, who was also afflicted with deafness.80 The child sued for
special and general damages.81
Initially, the court criticized Curlender for obscuring the differ-
ence between ordinary prenatal negligence and wrongful life law-
suits.82 By failing to take the nonexistence paradox into account, the
Turpin court reasoned, the Curlender court failed to award proper
damages.83 Nevertheless, the Turpin court also had strong words for
other old-fashioned decisions:
76. Id. at 490.
77. Id. at 488 (suggesting that if parents consciously chose to proceed with a pregnancy
while knowing that their infant would be born seriously impaired, parents should be liable in
tort to their children). Of course, this is troubling, because Roe gives mothers a constitutionally
enshrined right to make a largely unfettered choice whether to carry a fetus to term. 410 U.S.
113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”). If mothers were to face potential liability for
choosing to give birth, this constitutionally protected choice would no longer be free.
78. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
79. Id. at 956.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 961.
83. See id.:
Because nothing defendants could have done would have given plaintiff an unim-
paired life, it appears inconsistent with basic tort principles to view the injury for
which defendants are legally responsible solely by reference to plaintiff’s present
condition without taking into consideration the fact that if defendants had not been
negligent she would not have been born at all.
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Although it is easy to understand and to endorse these decisions’ de-
sire to affirm the worth and sanctity of less-than-perfect life, we
question whether these considerations alone provide a sound basis
for rejecting the child’s tort action. To begin with, it is hard to see
how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering
child would “disavow” the value of life or in any way suggest that
the child is not entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal
rights and privileges accorded to all members of society.84
The court therefore fashioned a middle ground, permitting the child
to recover special damages, but not general damages.85
Judge Mosk immediately seized on this discrepancy, complaining
that the majority opinion was “internally inconsistent”86 because it
failed to “suggest [any] principle of law that justifies so neatly circum-
scribing the nature of damages suffered as a result of a defendant’s
negligence.”87 The court effectively overruled Curlender, and Judge
Mosk wished to continue with the Curlender rule.88
2. Washington. The Supreme Court of Washington followed
California’s lead in Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.89 The court found
Turpin highly persuasive in considering the Harbeson children’s
wrongful life claim, particularly with regard to the rationale for
awarding special damages.90 Moreover, in addition to wishing to allo-
cate these costs to the negligent doctors, the Harbeson court also
84. Id. at 961–62.
85. Id. at 965–66:
[I]t would be illogical and anomalous to permit only parents, and not the child, to re-
cover for the cost of the child’s own medical care. If such a distinction were estab-
lished, the afflicted child’s receipt of necessary medical expenses might well depend
on the wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether the parents are available to sue and
recover such damages or whether the medical expenses are incurred at a time when
the parents remain legally responsible for providing such care.
86. Id. at 966 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“I see no persuasive reason to either abandon [Curlender’s]
doctrine, or to dilute its effectiveness by limiting recovery to special damages.”).
89. 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
90. Id. at 495:
The child’s need for medical care and other special costs attributable to his defect will
not miraculously disappear when the child attains his majority. In many cases, the
burden of those expenses will fall on the child’s parents or the state. Rather than al-
lowing this to occur by refusing to recognize the cause of action, we prefer to place
the burden of those costs on the party whose negligence was in fact a proximate cause
of the child’s continuing need for such special medical care and training.
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wished to deter negligent doctors.91 Finally, the court remained cogni-
zant of the nonexistence paradox; that is why it only granted special
damages, and not general damages.92
3. New Jersey. In Procanik v. Cillo,93 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey concluded that a wrongful life plaintiff could recover special
damages, but not general damages.94 In reaching this conclusion, the
court was especially persuaded by Turpin’s emphasis on fairness:
Law is more than an exercise in logic, and logical analysis, although
essential to a system of ordered justice, should not become an in-
strument of injustice. Whatever logic inheres in permitting parents
to recover for the cost of extraordinary medical care incurred by a
birth-defective child, but in denying the child’s own right to recover
those expenses, must yield to the inherent injustice of that result.
The right to recover the often crushing burden of extraordinary ex-
penses visited by an act of medical malpractice should not depend
on the “wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether the parents are
available to sue.”95
G. Culling Wrongful Life Themes
The vast majority of American jurisdictions continue to dismiss
wrongful life lawsuits because they fail to discern an injury. However,
three maverick courts permit limited wrongful life claims that deny
recovery of general damages (which include pain, suffering, and emo-
tional distress) while granting special damages (which include medical
expenses).96 The elements of such wrongful life claims appear to be
that a doctor breached a duty to the child by negligently depriving the
mother of the opportunity to abort, and that this deprivation caused
injury to the child because the mother would have aborted but for the
doctor’s negligence. Nevertheless, these maverick courts permit
wrongful life claims purely on the basis of intangible notions of fair-
91. Id. at 496 (“Imposition of a corresponding duty to the child will similarly foster the so-
cietal objectives of genetic counseling and prenatal testing, and will discourage malpractice.”).
92. See id. (“We agree . . . that measuring the value of an impaired life as compared to
nonexistence is a task that is beyond mortals, whether judges or jurors. However, we do not
agree that the impossibility of valuing life and nonexistence precludes the action altogether.”).
93. 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
94. Id. at 757.
95. Id. at 762 (quoting Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982)).
96. None of the three courts addressed whether punitive damages should be available.
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ness, failing to recognize that their conclusions also comport with
leading economic theory.
III.  FAILED ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE
NONEXISTENCE PARADOX
Scholars have made several interesting and intriguing attempts to
circumvent the nonexistence paradox, but all have failed to convince
a court to adopt their approach. Among these suggestions are (1)
holding doctors strictly liable, treating wrongful life like ordinary pre-
natal negligence, treating wrongful life as a misrepresentation case,
and treating wrongful life like an injured parenting case; (2) analogies
to end-of-life lawsuits and blending wrongful life with family law
remedies; and (3) making the child’s claim parasitic on the parents’
wrongful birth claim. This Part explores such approaches and explains
the shortcomings of each.
A. Strict Liability, Ordinary Prenatal Negligence, Misrepresentation
Law Analogy, and Impaired Parental Capacity
One author suggests imposing strict liability on doctors “who dis-
seminate avoidably inaccurate genetic information.”97 Strict liability
entails “liability without fault.”98 The benefit of this approach is that it
would reduce the child’s burden of proving that his life is an injury,
and prevent courts from tripping over the metaphysical paradox.
Another writer suggests treating wrongful life lawsuits as any
other ordinary prenatal negligence lawsuit.99 He essentially suggests
treating injury as a thing-in-itself that happens apart from the plain-
tiff.100 Thus, a doctor’s breach of his duty can be said to proximately
cause a case of Tay-Sachs disease or deafness to have come into be-
ing. The child then gets to recover general damages for these injuries-
in-themselves, after the injuries are reattached to the plaintiff. The
commentator believes that “[o]ne important advantage of the focus in
this analysis on impairments, and especially its avoidance of the non-
97. Belsky, supra note 17, at 248.
98. KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, § 75, at 534.
99. Hanson, supra note 13, at 17 (“The most direct way to deal with the nonexistence
problem is to accept it at face value and to hold that, for certain plaintiffs, never having been
born really would be preferable to living.”).
100. Id.
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existence paradox, is that actions can also be intelligibly brought for
impairments not so severe as to make life not worth living.”101
Professor Michael Kelly suggests using misrepresentation law to
address wrongful life claims: “Borrowing from misrepresentation law,
courts could seek to put the plaintiff in the position she would have
occupied if the counselor’s diagnosis had been correct—as a child
who does not suffer from genetic impairments.”102
Finally, Judge Handler in his opinions has consistently advocated
a theory of impaired or diminished parental capacity, to establish that
the child has suffered an ascertainable injury.103 Essentially, parents
become so depressed after unexpectedly discovering that their child is
deformed or retarded, that they become incapable of effective par-
enting. Judge Handler views the child’s injury as potentially parasitic
on the parents’ injury.104
Although these solutions are novel, the common shortcoming of
all these approaches is that they merely allocate the entire loss to the
doctor, thereby transforming doctors from medical services providers
into insurers. Doctors are not capable of guaranteeing perfect chil-
dren. There are many situations in which doctors would not breach
the standard of medical care, but children would still be born with
birth defects. When doctors have not breached the standard of medi-
cal care, they should not be held liable for the damages that proxi-
mately result. It would be unfair to hold doctors fully liable for inju-
ries they did not create, and would tend to overdeter doctors. The
doctor’s negligence caused the infant to come into being, but the doc-
tor’s negligence did not cause the child to develop and suffer from a
particular disease or deformity. To force doctors to pay general dam-
ages for conditions they did not cause is inappropriate.105
101. Id. at 23.
102. Kelly, supra note 22, at 525.
103. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 767 (N.J. 1984) (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting)
(“Not only must [parents] deal with the unanticipated shock of discovering that their child is
handicapped, but also they must cope with the belief that but for their failure to decide their
child’s fate they might have spared the child a life of affliction.”); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8,
19 (N.J. 1979) (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he injury consists of a diminished
childhood in being born of parents kept ignorant of her defective state while unborn and who,
on that account, were less fit to accept and assume their parental responsibilities.”).
104. Berman, 404 A.2d at 19 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting) (“Plausibly, the child’s
injury and loss in the form of diminished childhood can be viewed as a derivative claim based
solely on the parents’ injury.”).
105. Additionally, Judge Handler’s approach would require the problematic recognition of a
right to adequate parenting.
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B. End-of-Life and Family Law Analogies
Several commentators suggest that courts should treat wrongful
life cases like end-of-life cases because both categories of plaintiffs
possess similar interests.106 The principle end-of-life case to which
wrongful life is compared is In re Quinlan.107 Quinlan created the sub-
stituted judgment doctrine, which allowed family members or other
legal guardians to choose whether an individual in a vegetative state
would choose to discontinue life support.108 Wrongful life scholars
contend that this rule should be extended to wrongful life lawsuits,
because it shows an example of when the state’s interest in preserving
life is overridden by other concerns.109 Moreover, as Professor Kelly
contends, it is easier to choose nonexistence than death.110
Professor Philip Peters suggests using ethic-of-care-based family
law rather than justice-based tort law.111 This theory purports to ex-
plain the “unprincipled” results of Turpin, Harbeson, and Procanik
by viewing the special damages remedy “as a rough form of supple-
mental child support rather than as compensatory damages.”112
106. E.g., Belsky, supra note 17, at 223–34; Kelly, supra note 22, at 537–49. Ironically, other
commentators who specialize in end-of-life cases also make the same comparison. However,
they conclude that the two situations are different, because they do not want end-of-life cases to
be treated like wrongful life cases—the blade cuts both ways. End-of-life scholars distinguish
wrongful life for its lack of an equivalent treatment of patient autonomy. See Philip G. Peters,
Jr., The Illusion of Autonomy at the End of Life: Unconsented Life Support and the Wrongful
Life Analogy, 45 UCLA L. REV. 673, 692 (1998) (“[W]rongful life cases contain no equivalent
exercise of patient autonomy. The sanctity of life argument is, therefore, qualitatively weaker in
the end-of-life cases.”).
107. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that a patient’s privacy rights trump the state’s inter-
est in preserving his life).
108. Id. at 666.
109. See, e.g., Belsky, supra note 17, at 227 (questioning why courts and legislatures respect
the autonomy of patients who choose to end life support, but not that of handicapped children,
because the “living patient is no more capable of concluding that death is preferable than is the
handicapped child . . . capable of deciding that nonlife is preferable to life with disability”).
110. Kelly, supra note 22, at 542–43:
Whether because of our biological or genetic wiring or our training from birth, dying
seems much harder to accept than never having been born. Nonexistence, never hav-
ing lived, seems mild by comparison to death. . . . A rational person might prefer
never to have been born, yet elect to continue living rather than face dying.
111. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Rethinking Wrongful Life: Bridging the Boundary Between Tort
and Family Law, 67 TUL. L. REV. 397, 399 (1992) (suggesting that legislatures should blend
family law and tort law so that tort defines the duties and family law defines the remedies of a
wrongful life claim, thereby allowing courts to “provide these children with adequate and just
protection”).
112. Id. at 406.
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The shortcoming of the end-of-life approach is that the actual
choice is vastly different. In end-of-life cases, courts are trying to pro-
tect a patient’s right to choose what kinds of medical treatment he
will receive, by using a subjective and objective test through a proxy.
In wrongful life cases, it is much harder to identify how the infant
would actually exercise its autonomy. Likewise, the shortcoming of
the family law approach is that it requires legislative action rather
than judicial action. It is unnecessary to go to a care-based model,
when an individual rights model, properly informed by economic con-
siderations and policies, achieves the same result.
C. Making Wrongful Life Claims Parasitic on Wrongful Birth Claims
Professor Alexander Capron suggests that the wrongful life claim
would be viable if it were considered parasitic on the parents’ claim.113
However, although that is true, that suggestion makes the wrong-
ful life claim superfluous. The whole point of a wrongful life claim
would be to allow recovery when the parents are unavailable to sue.
Double recovery is not allowed. So, for example, if the statute of limi-
tations had run out on the parents’ wrongful birth claim, the child
would not be able to assert a wrongful life claim that is parasitic on
the parents’ rights because the parents could no longer exercise those
legal rights.
IV.  AN ECONOMIC APPROACH:
THE ENTITLEMENT FRAMEWORK
Tort is a policy-driven field of law. Economic analysis informs
tort policy by allocating liability where it should lie. This Part eluci-
dates why the burden of paying medical expenses (i.e., special dam-
ages) but not pain and suffering (i.e., general damages) should fall on
the shoulders of negligent doctors.
A. The Calabresi and Melamed Framework: Allocating Entitlements
Entitlements are protected by three different kinds of legal rules:
property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules.114 The state must
113. Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV.
618, 652 (1979).
114. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inal-
ienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1972).
BURNS IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03 2:51 PM
2003] WHEN LIFE IS AN INJURY 825
first decide whom to entitle.115 For example, the state could theoreti-
cally choose to entitle rapists over those who prefer bodily integrity.116
Once this initial decision is made, the state must enforce its entitle-
ment.117
The second decision a state must make is how to entitle that per-
son.118 The state has three choices. The state can choose a property
rule, which requires “someone who wishes to remove the entitlement
from its holder [to] buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in
which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”119
The state can choose a liability rule, which allows “someone [to] de-
stroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively de-
termined value for it.”120 Finally, having chosen whether to protect the
entitlement with a liability rule or a property rule, the state must
choose whether the entitlement is transferable or inalienable.121
1. Choosing Whom to Entitle. Three policy considerations de-
termine to whom entitlements should be given: “economic efficiency,
distributional preferences, and other justice considerations.”122
115. Id. at 1090:
Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more people, or
two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor. Absent such a deci-
sion, access to goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of “might
makes right”—whoever is stronger or shrewder will win. Hence the fundamental
thing that law does is to decide which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to pre-
vail.
116. Id. at 1091.
117. Id.:
The need for intervention applies in a slightly more complicated way to injuries.
When a loss is left where it falls in an auto accident, it is not because God so ordained
it. Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an entitlement to be free of li-
ability and will intervene to prevent the victim’s friends, if they are stronger, from
taking compensation from the injurer.
118. Id. at 1092.
119. Id.
120. Id. An “objectively determined value” means that the state will decide the objective
value of the entitlement. Id.
121. Id. (“An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller.”).
122. Id. at 1093. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed criticize administrative efficiency as
an insufficient reason to allocate entitlements. See id. at 1093 (conceding that the “administra-
tive cost[] of enforcement” is a simple reason for allocating entitlements, but contending that
“[b]y itself this reason will never justify any result except that of letting the stronger win”).
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A given entitlement is economically efficient if it is both Pareto
optimal and Kaldor-Hicks efficient.123 Pareto optimality occurs when
“any movement from an allocation would make at least one person
worse off.”124 Pareto superiority occurs when an allocation “leaves at
least one person better off and no one is made worse off.”125 Pareto
optimality and superiority are usually contrasted with Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency (also called wealth maximization). An allocation is Kaldor-
Hicks efficient if “those individuals made better off by a policy or re-
allocation [were] made sufficiently better off that they could compen-
sate those who are made worse off. The key here is that the compen-
sation is ‘potential,’ not actual.”126
By “Pareto optimal,” Melamed and Calabresi mean both Pareto
optimal and Kaldor-Hicks efficient, because they would only choose
allocations that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient, and then require the eco-
nomic winners to compensate the economic losers. However, “what is
a Pareto optimal, or economically efficient, solution varies with the
starting distribution of wealth.”127
Thus, there are five economic conclusions regarding economic
efficiency: (1) entitlements should favor “knowledgeable choices be-
tween social benefits and the social costs of obtaining them, and be-
tween social costs and the social costs of avoiding them”;128 (2) the
cost of an activity should rest on the shoulders of the party best
placed to analyze the costs and benefits of the activity to society; (3)
in accidents, the party that can most cheaply avoid the injury should
bear the costs; (4) if that party cannot be identified, the costs should
be placed on the party with the lowest transaction costs; and (5)
courts must decide whether to rely on the market or objective judicial
valuations of the entitlement.129
The second consideration is distributional preferences. Distribu-
tional preferences are less concrete than economic efficiency consid-
erations, because they rely on a society’s “wealth distribution prefer-
123. Id. at 1094 (defining economic efficiency as entitlements that allocate resources in a
way “that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained by it that
they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off than before”).
124. JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES 50 (2002).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 59.
127. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 114, at 1096.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1096–97.
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ences,” which take into consideration economic efficiency, caste pref-
erences, and social judgments of individual worth.130
The final consideration is a catch-all: “other justice reasons.”131
This is anything that is not an efficiency or distributional concern, and
tends to mean some conception of intrinsic fairness.132
2. Choosing How to Allocate Entitlements. Property rules
should be the default rule for protecting an entitlement.133 However,
property rules plus voluntary transfer cannot be universally applied
because transaction costs could prevent future transfer,134 and an illiq-
uid market could prevent accurate appraisal of the value of the enti-
tlement. Thus, in cases in which there are high transaction costs, such
as accidents,135 liability rules are preferable.136
A second situation in which liability rules should be chosen in
lieu of property rules is when a liability rule would “facilitate[] a
combination of efficiency and distributive results which would be dif-
ficult to achieve under a property rule.”137 Often, it is cheaper and
more efficient to promote distributional goals through collective
valuation.138
An inalienability rule should be selected when the transaction
would result in significant costs to third parties (i.e., negative exter-
nalities), or “when external costs do not lend themselves to collective
130. Id. at 1098. The term “caste preferences” tends to mean social morality, or how society
views itself.
131. Id. at 1102.
132. Id. at 1105 (emphasizing that “justice notions adhere to efficiency and broad distribu-
tional preferences as well as to other more idiosyncratic ones. . . . [that] though plausibly origi-
nally linked to efficiency, have now a life of their own”).
133. See id. at 1106 (suggesting that property rules are more economically efficient, except
when transaction costs would prohibit efficient market transfers of the entitlement).
134. Id. (“Often the cost of establishing the value of an initial entitlement by negotiation is
so great that even though a transfer of the entitlement would benefit all concerned, such a trans-
fer will not occur.”).
135. Id. at 1108–09.
136. Id. at 1110 (“[A] very common reason, perhaps the most common one, for employing a
liability rule rather than a property rule to protect an entitlement is that market valuation of the
entitlement is deemed inefficient, that is, it is either unavailable or too expensive compared to a
collective valuation.”).
137. Id. (“[U]se of a liability rule may allow us to accomplish a measure of redistribution
that could only be attained at prohibitive sacrifice of efficiency if we employed a corresponding
property rule.”).
138. Id.
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measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary.”139 Two
other reasons for selecting inalienability rules are “self paternalism
and true paternalism.”140
B. The Coase Framework
This Section illustrates why the decision of whom to entitle with
a property rule only matters economically when transaction costs are
nontrivial.
1. Pigouvian Liability: Internalize Externalities. When activities
have positive or negative externalities, agents fail to perceive the ul-
timate good or evil of their actions. Thus, agents underproduce or
overproduce those activities that create positive or negative external-
ities. Socially optimal levels of such production would occur if gov-
ernment changed agents’ incentives by taxing activities that create
negative externalities, and subsidizing activities that create positive
externalities. In this way, agents would capture the benefit of their
positive externalities and would bear the cost of their negative exter-
nalities.141
2. Coase and Transaction Costs: Internalize Externalities Unless
It Costs Too Much. Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are superfluous
when the agents who created or suffered the consequences of the
harms can dicker costlessly over the costs and benefits of their activ-
ity.142 To illustrate, most Pigouvian economists favored holding pol-
luters liable to those injured by their smoke, or taxing those pollut-
139. Id. at 1111.
140. Id. at 1113. Self paternalism is when an individual or group sets forth a prospective rule
that will protect them in moments of weakness. Id. (citing as examples (1) Ulysses tying himself
to the mast when his ship sailed past the Sirens, and (2) the Founding Fathers creating the Bill
of Rights). Current examples include the voidability of contracts made while drunk or under
duress. Id. True paternalism means that people cannot sell something because it is objectively
not in their interest to sell it. Id. This is why American law forbids selling organs.
141. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (Transaction
Publishers 2002) (1952) (developing a theoretical framework to analyze the efficiency of re-
source allocation).
142. Economists recognize that Pigouvian taxes and subsidies still work, but they are very
difficult to implement as a practical matter because they are hard to assess at the correct level.
For example, when government taxes, firms produce less because their marginal costs increase.
If government taxes at the old quantity of production, the firm will be overtaxed. If government
could tax at the new quantity of production, the Pigouvian tax would work, but it is nearly im-
possible for government to predict the firm’s new quantity of production.
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ers.143 However, when there are no transaction costs, the ultimate lev-
els of pollution do not change whether polluters were made liable or
the victims of pollution bore their own costs, because the polluters
and victims would dicker until they reached the socially optimal bal-
ance between production of goods and pollution.144 Thus, when trans-
action costs are trivial, it makes no economic difference to whom the
entitlement is allocated.145
Nevertheless, when nontrivial transactions costs exist (such as
discovering what to purchase, from whom, on what terms, negotiating
and drafting a contract, and enforcing the contract), then it matters to
whom the entitlement is given. In such situations, a free market rear-
rangement of rights will not always occur, even when it would in-
crease the value of production.146
C. Summarizing the Entitlement Framework
The true first order decision is to determine whether there are
transaction costs; otherwise, deciding whom to entitle is economically
inconsequential.147 If the state determines that meaningful transaction
costs exist, then it should decide how to entitle. The strong default
143. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1–2, 26 (1960); see also id.
at 27 (“What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the
loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produces the
harm.”).
144. Id. at 6 (“[T]he allocation of resources will be the same [when the damaging business is
not liable for its injuries] as it was when the damaging business was liable for damage caused.”).
145. Id. at 8:
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage
caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can
be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result
(which maximises [sic] the value of production) is independent of the legal position if
the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.
Professor Coase thought it was imperative that “the rights of the various parties should be well-
defined.” Id. at 19.
146. Id. at 16:
In these conditions [of transaction costs] the initial delimitation of legal rights does
have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic system operates. One ar-
rangement of rights may bring about a greater value of production than any other.
But unless this is the arrangement of rights established by the legal system, the costs
of reaching the same result by altering and combining rights through the market may
be so great that this optimal arrangement of rights, and the greater value of produc-
tion which it would bring, may never be achieved.
147. Calabresi and Melamed contend that the state must first decide whom to entitle. How-
ever, if there are no transaction costs and the entitlement is protected by a property rule, then
the parties will be able to dicker to achieve the socially optimal result—no matter which party
had the original entitlement.
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choice should be for property rules, because private ordering of enti-
tlements is generally more efficient and takes into consideration the
actual parties’ valuations better than a court’s objective determina-
tion. However, property rules are inappropriate when significant
transaction costs must be overcome for the market to accurately ap-
praise the value of the entitlement. A prime example of when a prop-
erty rule is inappropriate is accidents. Likewise, when a property rule
would lead to an inequitable distributional outcome, then liability
rules are better, because they permit judicial intervention to objec-
tively assess the value of entitlements for weaker parties. Inalienabil-
ity rules should be selected when transactions would result in negative
externalities, or when the state wishes to paternalistically protect its
citizens.
Once the state has decided how to entitle, it should decide whom
to entitle based on economic efficiency, distributional preferences,
and other justice considerations. The entitlement is efficiently allo-
cated if there is a net social benefit, and economic winners are re-
quired to compensate economic losers. This implies that the cost
should be borne by the party in the best position to calculate the so-
cial costs and benefits of using the entitlement, or the party that can
most cheaply avoid the costs, or the party that can act in the market
with the lowest transaction costs to correct errors in entitlement. The
entitlement is distributed appropriately if it does not conflict with so-
ciety’s wealth distribution preferences. The entitlement conflicts with
society’s wealth distribution preferences if it is inefficient, upsets caste
preferences, or interferes with social judgments of individual worth.
An entitlement is consistent with other justice factors if it simply
resonates with an inherent sense of fairness.
V.  THE FINAL RITE OF PASSAGE:
BRINGING WRONGFUL LIFE INTO ADULTHOOD
In economic terms, current wrongful life precedent actually
means that doctors have an entitlement as to children (but not as to
parents), to negligently or intentionally fail to diagnose a child’s con-
dition, and to negligently or intentionally fail to inform the mother of
the child’s condition.148 However, I argue that this entitlement is
148. Although courts have nominally said that doctors owe duties not to be negligent in this
fashion, courts have substantively reached the opposite conclusion—to speak of an unenforce-
able duty is to speak of an oxymoron. However, courts that have denied wrongful life claims
have not justified their allocation of this entitlement in economic terms. See supra Part II.
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properly allocated to the child and should be protected by a liability
rule. Section A analyzes the wrongful life problem via the economic
model sketched in Part IV, and demonstrates why this loss should be
allocated to the doctor. Section B explains how this loss can be allo-
cated to the doctor within the existing tort framework of duty, breach,
causation, and injury, by setting forth a financial theory of injury.
A. Entitlements
1. Transaction Costs. The first inquiry is, assuming that a prop-
erty rule protected an entitlement to negligently or intentionally fail
to diagnose or inform a mother of her child’s condition, whether there
would be significant transaction costs.149
Here, there would clearly be extraordinary transaction costs be-
tween the mother and the doctor. Asking a mother to set a value on
the price of her child’s health is almost impossible—a mother who has
any affection for her offspring would not be able to set the price at
which she would accept a retarded or deformed baby in lieu of a
healthy baby. Because of a mother’s inability to set a price on her
baby’s health, if a mother was required to purchase from a doctor his
entitlement to negligently or intentionally fail to diagnose her child,
negotiations would be extremely costly because one of the parties
would not have a bottom line. Moreover, to be crude, no legal liquid
market provides information to market participants about the going
rate for a healthy newborn baby instead of a baby with birth defects.150
Finally, drafting such a contract would be expensive because it is un-
likely that either party would be satisfied with a form contract, given
how personal and emotionally intense such decisions would be.
149. Obviously, to the extent a property rule would obtain, the parents would necessarily
have to act as bargaining proxies for their unborn child. Property rule protection would be even
more problematic because the unborn child cannot bargain on its own behalf.
150. But cf. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Short-
age, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) (arguing for a market solution to the adoption problem
of the baby shortage); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 59, 72 (1987) (“So we [already] have legal baby selling today; the question of public
policy is not whether baby selling should be forbidden or allowed but how extensively it should
be regulated. I simply think it should be regulated less stringently than is done today.”). For a
sarcastic proposal for such a legal liquid market, see JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL
AND OTHER SATIRES 259–66 (Prometheus Books 1995) (1729) (noting that young healthy chil-
dren are “a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or
boiled,” and therefore suggesting, humbly and modestly, that poor Irish people should breed
their children for consumption on the market, to prevent poor Irish children from burdening the
public fisc).
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2. Property Rule or Liability Rule. Because there assuredly
would be significant transaction costs if the entitlement were pro-
tected by a property rule, it is necessary to determine what kind of
rule should protect the entitlement.
Here, I argue that a liability rule should be employed to protect
the entitlement. The mother would find it nearly impossible to de-
termine her bottom line in negotiations. Thus, because of the transac-
tion costs that this indecisiveness would cause, private ordering in the
market would be unable to accurately assess the value of the entitle-
ment. This should not be surprising, because, after all, when a court
entertains a wrongful life lawsuit, the court is generally considering to
whom to give an entitlement to commit an accident, and entitlements
for accidents are best addressed via liability rules.
Moreover, a property rule would lead to an inequitable distribu-
tional outcome, because either doctors would undervalue the worth
of their patients’ children, or parents would overvalue the worth of
their children. Given that doctors generally have much greater mar-
ket power than their patients, mimicking the market would consis-
tently undercompensate patients and overcompensate doctors for
bearing risks. Thus, it is better for courts to intervene and collectively
assess the value of the entitlement for both parties.
3. Whom to Entitle: Economic Efficiency. Now that a liability
rule has been chosen to protect the entitlement, it is necessary to de-
termine whom to entitle.
Here, the doctor should not be allocated an entitlement to negli-
gently or intentionally fail to diagnose children or inform their moth-
ers about the potential retardation or deformation, because to do so is
inefficient, does not satisfy society’s distributional concerns, and vio-
lates other justice considerations.
Placing children with birth defects into the world creates a net
social cost, because such children require scarce medical resources
and are not capable of contributing other resources to society. If the
doctor is not held liable for the child’s wrongful life, then this burden
would probably be borne by the child’s parents, by the child (as when
the child has a trust fund), or, finally, by the state. This is inappropri-
ate. Because the doctor has created this social inefficiency, the doctor
should be required, á la Pigou, to internalize this negative externality
by compensating the child. Note that this entitlement scheme merely
gives doctors the same economic incentives to avoid negligent or in-
tentional injuries as the wrongful birth entitlement scheme.
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Doctors should bear the costs because they are in a better posi-
tion to avoid the costs. Doctors are in the best position to calculate
this potential social cost because only doctors have access to the nec-
essary information (and technical ability to understand this informa-
tion) to determine whether a child will be retarded or deformed. Fur-
thermore, doctors are able to obtain liability insurance more easily
than parents or fetuses: obstetricians are involved in many more
births than are either the individual parents who give birth or the in-
dividual fetuses who are born. Doctors already obtain liability insur-
ance for the rest of their medical practice, so this would only margin-
ally increase the cost of the services they provide, whereas it would be
very time consuming and expensive in terms of transaction costs for
parents to purchase insurance that would provide for their child’s ex-
penses and their heartbreak if their child were born deformed or re-
tarded. Because doctors incur fewer transaction costs in obtaining li-
ability insurance, they can more cheaply diffuse the social costs of
children with birth defects.
Moreover, requiring doctors to compensate children and parents
provides an economic deterrent incentive for doctors to be more cir-
cumspect about avoiding negligent (or intentional) behavior. Because
doctors are the only ones who could avoid this injury, doctors should
be responsive to this economic incentive. Requiring negligent doctors
to compensate children for their medical expenses (and deal with the
hassle of defending lawsuits) would provide the same amount of de-
terrence as in wrongful birth lawsuits.
Although some might argue that there are enough other punish-
ments to deter negligent doctors, such as losing medical board certifi-
cation, two objections can be raised immediately. The first objection
is that there are other prenatal negligence lawsuits. If nontort reme-
dies were enough to deter doctors from being negligent, other prena-
tal negligence lawsuits would also be superfluous—but no one credi-
bly argues that all prenatal negligence lawsuits are superfluous, so this
argument is weak. The second objection is that medical licensing
boards tend to revoke licenses only for intentional or grossly negli-
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gent behavior, not for merely negligent behavior.151 But doctors carry
insurance precisely to deal with negligent mishaps.
4. Whom to Entitle: Distributional Preferences. Doctors should
not be entitled to negligently or intentionally fail to diagnose children
or inform their mothers about potential retardation or deformation
because, otherwise, inequitable distributional results would obtain.
Patients are at a relative disadvantage to doctors in negotiating the
transfer of this entitlement because they do not understand the rele-
vant medical information as well as doctors, and because they are
hopelessly lost in evaluating the financial value of their own child.
Because there is no economic deterrent effect if doctors are granted
this entitlement, such an entitlement scheme is socially inefficient be-
cause it would result in more children with birth defects who drain so-
ciety’s resources. Furthermore, whether or not such an entitlement
would upset caste preferences, it would interfere with the parents’
judgment of the individual worth of their child.
5. Whom to Entitle: Other Justice Considerations. Holding doc-
tors liable in wrongful life lawsuits is consistent with “other justice
considerations” because doctors are already held liable in wrongful
birth lawsuits, and the two kinds of legal claims are economically in-
distinguishable. It simply seems unfair for children not to be able to
recover their medical expenses when a doctor has clearly done some-
thing wrong.152 As the Curlender court recognized, “[t]he reality of the
‘wrongful life’ concept is that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers,
due to the negligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just to re-
treat into meditation on the mysteries of life.”153
6. Administrability. Administrability should not bar liability be-
cause courts and juries can easily determine whether a child is de-
151. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-14(a)(6) (2002) (revoking medical licenses for
“[u]nprofessional conduct, including . . . departure from . . . the standards of acceptable and
prevailing medical practice . . . . [only if] the Board can establish that the treatment has a safety
risk greater than the prevailing treatment or that the treatment is generally not effective”). In
practice, doctors do not forfeit their licenses for mere negligence, as illustrated by the absence
of any such case under North Carolina law.
152. See Kelly, supra note 22, at 589 (concluding that “theories based on deterrence, cost-
spreading, and fairness all seem to support permitting the child victim of a genetic counseling
tort to recover” (emphasis added)).
153. Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis
added).
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formed or whether a doctor was negligent; courts and juries do this all
the time. Moreover, courts and juries already perform these functions
in wrongful birth lawsuits. The only difficult question is the highly
esoteric one of whether life can be considered a legal injury. Whether
life is an injury or whether life is not, courts would not have any addi-
tional difficulty separating meritorious lawsuits from fraudulent law-
suits.
7. Summary. Economic analysis illustrates that the child should
be given the entitlement in wrongful life lawsuits to have the doctor
avoid the negligent or intentional failure to diagnose or inform his
mother about his potential retardation or deformation, just as parents
are given the entitlement in wrongful birth lawsuits, and that this enti-
tlement should be protected by a liability rule. The legal paradigm
should accommodate this policy determination via the models in Sec-
tion B.
B. Connecting Entitlements to the Tort Paradigm: Charting a Legal
Map to Circumnavigate the Injury Element
If courts are to be taken at their word, the single tort element
that prevents children from recovering for wrongful life is injury.154
Economic considerations dictate that courts should hold doctors li-
able for their negligence when that result is compatible with the tort
paradigm. The tort paradigm can achieve this result by construing the
injury in wrongful life as an economic harm to the financial condition
of the child. This would allow children to recover medical expenses
(because those expenses constitute the injury) but not pain and suf-
fering (because those costs collide with the nonexistence paradox).
1. Model One: Recovery for Defects Depends on Income
Streams. The injury to the child should be construed as a financial in-
jury. The doctor has condemned a severely deformed or retarded
child to a life in which the child will never be economically self-
sufficient—the child will be unable to support himself or pay for his
medical expenses by exchanging his labor for wages. Thus, the doctor
has quite literally injured the child’s financial wellbeing by causing
him to be born.155
154. See supra Part II.
155. Homo economicus could rationally choose nonexistence over negative income. For an
example of how an individual in American society may rationally choose death, see generally
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When the injury is construed as a financial harm, it is easy to
identify and calculate. For simplicity’s sake, suppose that a child, be-
fore existence, has an income stream of zero dollars (because he can-
not exchange his labor for income and has no expenses). Now, imag-
ine that a jury determines that, after coming into deformed or
retarded existence, a particular child has an income stream of nega-
tive $750,000 (because he has no income but has considerable medical
expenses). Thus, if this child were viewed through the narrow specta-
cles of economics, the child’s injury becomes apparent. Here, the
child would have suffered $750,000 worth of injuries—the expenses
that he will have to pay. The nonexistence paradox dissolves because
the court does not have to weigh the benefits of existence against the
unknowable costs of nonexistence. Here, there are cold, hard num-
bers with which to accurately calculate the extent of the child’s injury.
To apply this model and determine whether the child is economi-
cally self-sufficient, juries should assess what the child’s likely positive
income stream would be, and subtract the child’s likely negative in-
come stream. If the negative income stream was greater than the
child’s positive income stream, the child should recover all of his spe-
cial damages. However, if the positive income stream outstripped the
negative income stream, then the child should recover nothing.
To make this model more concrete, suppose Mrs. Hudson, a sin-
gle mother, is pregnant with triplets: Sherlock, Irene, and Moriarty.
Mrs. Hudson asks Dr. Watson if there is any unusual possibility that
any of her children would be born with any birth defects, because if
so, she would abort. Dr. Watson negligently tells Mrs. Hudson that
there is no unusual possibility that her children will be born with any
birth defects. In fact, Sherlock is born with a cleft lip, Irene is born
with a lung ailment that requires monitoring for the rest of her life,
and Moriarty is born with polycystic kidney disease. Tragically, Mrs.
Hudson dies during labor. Sherlock, Irene, and Moriarty sue Dr. Wat-
son for wrongful life. Which of these plaintiffs would be able to make
out a wrongful life claim under this model?
ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN (Penguin Books 1999) (1949). Indeed, in this play,
the protagonist rationally chose death over negative income, which is a slightly different choice.
See also Christopher Bigsby, Afterword to MILLER, supra, at 111, 127 (responding to a specta-
tor’s remark that Death of a Salesman was a “time bomb under American capitalism” by
agreeing and hoping that it was, “or at least under the bullshit of capitalism, this pseudo life that
thought to touch the clouds by standing on top of a refrigerator, waving a paid-up mortgage at
the moon, victorious at last”).
BURNS IN FINAL READ.DOC 07/30/03 2:51 PM
2003] WHEN LIFE IS AN INJURY 837
Clearly, Sherlock would not be able to recover for wrongful life.
Sherlock’s negative income stream would be negligible because cleft
lips only require minor cosmetic surgery to correct. On the other side
of the equation, Sherlock’s positive income stream would hardly be
affected. Sherlock would still be economically self-sufficient because
he could exchange his labor for wages. Sherlock’s claim fails because
his positive income stream outstrips his negative income stream.
Just as clearly, Moriarty would be able to recover for wrongful
life. Moriarty’s negative income stream would be substantial because
he would require expensive and continual medical treatments during
his short life. Because polycystic kidney disease is terminal at a very
young age, Moriarty could never exchange his labor for wages. So his
positive income stream would be nil. Because Moriarty’s negative in-
come stream outstrips his positive income stream, Moriarty’s claim
succeeds, and he would recover the entire cost of his medical treat-
ments.
However, it is highly uncertain whether Irene would be able to
recover for wrongful life. Irene’s negative income stream may or may
not be substantial because it is unclear how extensive and expensive
this medical monitoring would be. On the other hand, Irene’s positive
income stream would be unaffected.156 Thus, Irene’s negative income
stream may or may not outstrip her positive income stream. If the
medical monitoring was more expensive than her positive income
stream, her claim would succeed. If the medical monitoring was less
expensive than her positive income stream, her claim would fail.
2. Model Two: Recovery for All Defects. The Irene problem re-
inforces that courts and juries incur transaction costs when deter-
mining which party should prevail. It would be costly for juries to de-
termine as a factual question how severe an injury must be for the
child to recover special damages for that injury. It would be no less
costly for courts to determine as a matter of law which injuries cannot
be compensated for with special damages. For example, there are
many forms of deformity or retardation the development of which
cannot be accurately predicted. Moreover, there are many cases in
which children are afflicted with more severe and less severe forms of
deformity and retardation. To require juries or courts to siphon these
separate claims into different channels of compensation could be ad-
156. The jury’s determination of Irene’s positive income stream would probably depend on
factors like socioeconomic status, parents’ education, jobs, etc.
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ministratively difficult and expensive. Thus, to avoid incurring these
administrative costs, it might make more sense to permit all children
to recover special damages for any deformity or retardation that af-
flicts them.
3. Punitive Damages. Under either model, the child could still
recover punitive damages, so long as his claim succeeds, because pu-
nitive damages are designed to deter malfeasance, not to compensate
injuries.157 Thus, the nonexistence paradox is unrelated to punitive
damages. Moreover, punitive damages in wrongful birth cannot be
differentiated from punitive damages in wrongful life.
4. Legal Authority. Some legal authority has suggested that
economic harms alone can be compensable without an actual physical
or emotional injury. For example, a federal circuit court in a mass tort
suit arising out of an airplane crash concluded that a hypothetical
plaintiff who was not injured, but incurred costs in determining
whether or not he was injured, could recover those medical ex-
penses.158 Courts could easily adapt this reasoning to permit children
to recover.
5. The Specter of Overcompensation. If overcompensation is a
concern, compensation would be limited by a number of factors. First,
as an initial threshold matter, doctors would still never be liable un-
less they breached the medical standard of care. Second, judges at the
157. See Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concur-
ring) (“Punitive damages can ensure that a wrongdoer bears all the costs of its actions, and is
thus appropriately deterred from causing harm, in those categories of cases in which compensa-
tory damages alone result in systematic underassessment of costs, and hence in systematic un-
derdeterrence.”).
158. Friends for All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984):
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is riding through a red light.
Jones lands on his head with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a hos-
pital where doctors recommend that he undergo a battery of tests to determine
whether he has suffered any internal head injuries. The tests prove negative, but
Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be the substantial cost of the diagnostic
examinations.
From our example, it is clear that even in the absence of physical injury Jones ought
to be able to recover the cost for the various diagnostic examinations proximately
caused by Smith’s negligent action.
This passage has been quoted frequently by other courts. Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869, 880
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (quoting with approval Lockheed, 746 F.2d at 825); Potter v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824 n.26 (Cal. 1993) (same); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
858 P.2d 970, 977–78 (Utah 1993) (same).
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summary judgment stage and jurors at the trial stage would be much
less likely to believe a mother who claims she would have aborted her
child because the child had a missing finger or a cleft lip, for example.
Thus, plaintiffs would generally lose when suing for outrageous inju-
ries. Third, the compensation required for more minor injuries would
not be as expensive to the defendant. Thus, if a child recovers for
deafness, the child would only recover for the costs of the medical
treatments and special schooling he would require. Finally, a wrong-
ful life claim has the same economic effect as a wrongful birth claim.
Indeed, the only difference is that the statute of limitations is tolled in
wrongful life claims, because the plaintiff is a minor. This proposed
solution would only support recovery of special damages, not general
damages, as recognition of the similarity of the two claims.
CONCLUSION
It is unfair for children with birth defects to suffer the conse-
quences of their inability to support themselves financially. The enti-
tlement framework illustrates why it makes little, if any, economic
sense for doctors to be entitled, as to children but not as to parents, to
negligently or intentionally fail to diagnose or inform parents about
likely birth defects.
Currently, many courts are unable to see through the miasma of
the nonexistence paradox and the fog of sanctity of life concerns to
hold doctors liable to children for their special medical expenses.
However, by narrowly conceiving the injury in an economic manner,
courts can focus their inquiry to burn through the haze of the nonex-
istence paradox, causing its concomitant sanctity of life concern to
dissolve and dissipate, and revealing the compassion and logic of re-
quiring negligent doctors to lighten the burden of children with birth
defects. Moreover, by identifying an analytic principle—financial
harm—compensation is limited to the actual injury the doctor has
created. As a result, doctors would not be overdeterred by this addi-
tional liability.
Because tort and economic policy support holding doctors liable
for their negligence, tort should adapt to hold doctors liable. This
Note attempts to blaze a new legal trail. If courts accept my invitation
to perform this new form of analysis in wrongful life lawsuits, they
would ultimately arrive at more economically justifiable and compas-
sionate results. As odd as it may sound, in certain circumstances, life
can and should be a compensable injury.
